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CEO’s Inside Debt and Dynamics
of Capital Structure
Eric R. Brisker and Wei Wang
Debt-type compensation (inside debt) exacerbates the divergence in risk preferences between the
chief executive officer (CEO) and shareholders and, in turn, affects capital structure decisions.
An excessively risk-averse CEO tends to use less debt than the shareholders desire, reduce debt
quickly when thefirm is overlevered, but is reluctant to increase debt when thefirm is underlevered.
We find that higher CEO’s inside debt ratio (i.e., inside debt as a percentage of total incentive
compensation) is associated with lower firm leverage and faster (slower) leverage adjustments
toward the shareholders’ desired level for overlevered (underlevered) firms. The CEO’s inside
debt ratio most conducive to capital structure rebalancing is around 10% ofthefirm’s market debt
ratio.

Two well-known types of agency conflicts exist within corporations: that between managers and
shareholders (separation of ownership and control) and that between shareholders and debtholders
(asset substitution or risk shifting). One remedy proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) for
these agency problems lies in the managerial compensation structure. On the one hand, firms
could use equity-type compensation such as stock and stock options to align managers’ interest
with shareholders. On the other hand, debt-type compensation (sometimes called inside debt),
including defined benefit pensions and deferred compensation, could incentivize managers to
take debtholders’ interests into account.*
1 They postulate that a manager whose compensation
consists of both equity and debt, similar to the firm’s debt and equity mix, would consider the
interests of both shareholders and debtholders appropriately.
In this article, we empirically investigate the impact of inside debt on the capital structure
dynamics of the firm. We consider how inside debt influences excessively risk-averse chief
executive officers (CEOs) in setting firm leverage ratios and the speed of adjustment (SOA) of
capital structure toward shareholders’ desired level. Edmans and Liu (2011) provide an analytical
model for deriving optimal compensation contracts, which include both inside equity and debt,
for managers facing effort and investment (i.e., risk preference) choices. They find that while
equity induces managerial effort, debt is part of the solution to the risk-shifting problem. In
particular, because the value of debt hinges not only on the probability of bankruptcy, but also
on the liquidation value if the firm fails, debt-type compensation serves as an efficient tool
to address the risk-shifting problem and finds its place in the optimal compensation structure.
They further determine that, in most cases, an equity bias (equity stake exceeding debt stake) in
We thank an anonymous reviewer and Raghavendra Rau (Editor) for their constructive comments.

1 The term “inside debt” as used in the analytical models of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Edmans and Liu (2011) refers
to granting the executive a straight fraction of the firm’s debt. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) confirm that certain forms
of compensation widely observed in practice (e.g., pensions and other deferred compensation contracts) have debt-type
payoffs and could potentially be viewed as inside debt. In this article, we use “debt-type compensation” and “inside debt”
interchangeably. Likewise, in some places we use “inside equity” to refer to equity-type compensation.

managerial compensation is optimal as the effort effect of equity-type compensation outweighs
its “occasional risk-shifting” effect.
The effect of inside debt on managerial risk preference is in need of more in-depth exploration,
especially when considering yet another type of agency problem: the divergence in risk preference
between managers and shareholders. In the Edmans and Liu (2011) model, managers are assumed
to be similar to well-diversified shareholders in that they are risk neutral. However, a substantial
literature has argued that managers behave in a more risk-averse fashion than shareholders would
prefer (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Amihud and Lev, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Hirshleifer
and Thakor, 1992; Klein and Coffee, 1996; Holmstrom, 1999; Gormley and Masta, 2016). Thus,
managers are more aligned with debtholders than shareholders to begin with in terms of risk
preference. Theoretically, offering managers equity-type compensation would encourage risk
taking and mitigate managerial conservatism, but offering them debt-type compensation would
have the unintended effect of exacerbating this agency problem. To the extent managers face
the same asymmetric payoff structure for their inside debt holdings as outside debtholders (i.e.,
they receive fixed payoffs if the firm is successful, but bear the loss proportionally if the firm
fails,) managers tend to act like debtholders (Bebchuk and Jackson, 2005). As a result, managers
compensated with high stakes of inside debt could have the tendency to adopt excessively
conservative business policies that would compromise shareholders’ wealth.
Among the financial policies that are subject to managers’ excessive conservatism, capital
structure is of particular interest as inside debt is hypothesized to help balance the interests of
outside shareholders and debtholders. Cassell et al. (2012) investigation provides some prelimi
nary evidence in this regard, but it is not the focus of their paper nor is it adequate to fully reveal
the relationship between managerial inside debt and firm leverage. In this article, we attempt to
conduct a focused and full-fledged investigation of this issue.
The use of debt incurs the risk of bankruptcy that is often described as increasing convexly with
the debt ratio. Excessively risk-averse managers would avoid lifting the debt ratio to the level that
shareholders desire. Consistent with this conjecture, Liao, Mukherjee, and Wang (2015) find that
firms, on average, are underlevered, falling short of using debt at the shareholders’ desired level.
Inside debt would aggravate managerial conservatism, so we hypothesize that managerial inside
debt holdings negatively influence the firm’s financial leverage. Moreover, the more risk-averse
the manager is, the less likely he would adjust leverage upwardly if the firm is underlevered, but
more likely he would adjust leverage downwardly if the firm is overlevered. Thus, our second
hypothesis is that managerial inside debt holdings negatively affect the capital structure SOA of
underlevered firms, but positively affect that of overlevered firms.
We use the CEO’s Inside Debt Ratio as our measure of managerial inside debt holdings,
defined as accumulated holdings of pensions and deferred compensation divided by total incentive
compensation, where total incentive compensation includes pensions, deferred compensation, and
the value of both stock and options. Using a sample of US firms from 2007 to 2013, we find
that a CEO’s inside debt ratio is quite persistent and it moves in tandem with the firm’s debt ratio
over calendar time. Over the length of the CEO’s tenure, however, the two variables exhibit a
mirror-image relationship. These patterns indicate the presence of common firm and time factors
that shape both the CEO’s inside debt and firm leverage, yet CEO’s inside debt may have a
negative within-firm effect on firm leverage. The estimation of an augmented capital structure
dynamics model using the Elsas and Florysiak (2015) doubly censored fractional dependent
variable estimator (DPF estimator) and the Blundell and Bond (1998) system generalized method
of moments (GMM) estimator conf irms our conjecture. We find that the CEO’s inside debt ratio
is negatively associated with firm leverage, and a one-standard deviation increase in CEO’s inside
debt leads to a nontrivial decrease of 1.7 percentage points in the firm’s debt ratio.

Based on the above estimates, we calculate shareholders’ desired leverage, assuming that
institutional shareholders own all of the outstanding shares and the CEO does not hold any inside
debt. These hypothetical values of institutional ownership and CEO’s inside debt are most likely
to produce the capital structure that is desired by shareholders as they represent a situation where
shareholders have a strong voice and managers’ excessive conservatism is contained by equity
compensation. Relative to our estimates of shareholders’ desired leverage, more than 80% of our
sample firms are underlevered. Further, we find that CEO’s inside debt holding encourages an
overlevered firm to adjust its leverage toward the shareholders’ desired level, but impedes an
underlevered firm from doing the same, consistent with our second hypothesis.
We address the potential endogeneity of CEO’s inside debt by: 1) controlling for fixed firm
and time effects, as well as a large array of firm and CEO characteristics, to alleviate omitted
variable bias, and 2) using growth in the older population (persons 65 years or older) in the state
where the firm is headquartered and the median industry inside debt ratio as instruments. Our
rationale for using state-level growth in the older population is that CEOs located in popular
migration destination states for the older population (i.e., Florida, California, etc.) might stay in
their positions longer and have less need for pensions and deferred compensation. The results do
not change after the instruments are employed. In addition, our results are qualitatively similar if
firm leverage is measured based on market equity or book equity. We further estimate the capital
structure SOA in subsamples for firms with different levels of CEO’s inside debt ratios and find
that SOA peaks when the CEO’s inside debt ratio is around one-tenth of the firm’s market debt
ratio.
All of our findings indicate that offering debt-type compensation exacerbates managers’ exces
sive conservatism when making capital structure decisions, which is detrimental to shareholder
value. In the presence of the manager-shareholders conflict of interest in risk preference, optimal
managerial compensation contracts would use less debt than postulated by Jensen and Meckling
(1976), and a deep equity bias is probably necessary.
Our work differs from Cassell et al.’s (2012) investigation of capital structure in several ways.
First, our measure of CEO’s inside debt holding does not involve the firm’s leverage ratio and
avoids a mechanical negative relation between the measure of inside debt and the firm’s debt ratio.
Second, our dynamic panel model, using fixed firm effects, accounts for the strong persistence
of capital structure (Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008). Failure to control for lagged leverage
and unobservable firm heterogeneity would likely lead to an omitted variable bias. Additionally,
when compared to Cassell et al.’s (2012) usage of three years of data, our longer sample period
allows us to explore the dynamics of capital structure in a richer fashion.

I. Related Literature
Jensen and Meckling (1976), in explaining the agency cost of debt, conjecture that managers
compensated with securities having payoffs similar to equity are incentivized to increase firm risk
beyond levels debtholders prefer, and take actions that expropriate wealth from debtholders to
shareholders through asset substitution. They suggest that compensating managers with securities
having payoffs similar to debt is one way to reduce this agency cost of debt. In fact, they postulate
that the agency cost of debt could be eliminated if the managers’ compensation structure is set
in a ratio equal to the firm’s leverage ratio, as managers would be incentivized to consider the
interests of both security holders appropriately.
Edmans and Liu (2011) argue that since creditors are concerned with the probability of
bankruptcy, as well as the liquidation value when bankruptcy occurs, optimal compensation

contracts should be sensitive to both. Debt-type compensation offers managers a payoff propor
tional to the liquidation value when bankruptcy occurs, which incentivizes them to avoid risk
shifting and to exert more effort in protecting, or maximizing, liquidation values when bankruptcy
becomes likely. They derive an optimal compensation contract that uses equity compensation as
a solution to the manager-shareholder agency problem, as it induces managerial effort, and debt
compensation as a solution to the shareholder-debtholder agency problem, as it discourages man
agers from risk-shifting behavior. They find that in most cases, an equity bias is optimal since
equity is more effective than debt in incentivizing effort, even though it also causes risk shifting.
Risk-related agency conflicts also exist between managers and shareholders when undiversified
managers have an incentive to take on less risk than is desired by diversified shareholders (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976). This is because a manager’s reputation and human capital greatly hinge on
the success of the firm he runs. In addition, ownership of the firm’s shares exposes the manager
to substantial firm-specific risk. To offset the risk-aversion increasing effect of stock ownership,
option-based compensation that provides a convex payoff structure is often used to encourage risk
taking (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). Managers sometimes even engage in value-destroying
actions that lower firm risk in order to reduce the incidence of negative firm outcomes that are
personally costly to the manager.
Previous literature regarding excessive conservatism of managers indicates it impacts firm’s
investment policy (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992), mergers and acquisitions (Amihud and Lev,
1981; Gormley and Masta, 2016), hedging behavior (Smith and Stulz, 1985), and capital structure
decisions (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992). For instance, Gormley and Masta (2016) find that
managers insulated by the adoption of a state-level antitakeover law engage in value-destroying,
diversifying acquisitions that reduce their firms’ stock volatility and risk of distress.
Empirical studies of managerial inside debt in recent years have been spurred by the pervasive
use of debt-type compensation in large US corporations (Bebchuk and Jackson, 2005) and, partic
ularly, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure rule in 2006 that mandates detailed
disclosure of executive compensation structure to include pension and deferred compensation
holdings. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find a positive association between CEO’s inside debt
holding and the distance to default indicating that inside debt moderates the CEO’s risk-shifting
tendency. Other research finds that inside debt holding decreases (increases) the firm’s cost of
debt (equity) and decreases the firm’s market risk levels (Wei and Yermack, 2011), lowers bor
rowing costs and reduces the use of debt covenants (Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong, 2014),
reduces accounting conservatism (Wang, Xie, and Xin, 2014), and the riskiness of the firm’s
investment and financing policies (Cassell et al., 2012). In addition, inside debt holdings are
positively associated with firm cash holdings (Liu, Mauer, and Zhang, 2014) and abnormal bond
returns at merger and acquisition (M&A) announcements (Phan, 2014), and negatively associated
with cash holding value (Liu et al., 2014) and abnormal stock returns at M&A announcements
(Phan, 2014).
When capital structure policy is considered, the literature provides mixed results. Sundaram and
Yermack (2007) confirm a positive relationship between the dollar amount of CEO’s inside debt
and firm leverage, while Cassell et al. (2012) demonstrate a negative association between a CEO’s
inside debt-to-equity ratio and firm leverage. However, due to data availability constraints, these
initial investigations were largely cross-sectional and unable to consider the dynamics of capital
structure that has been the core of recent capital structure studies (Flannery and Rangan, 2006;
Lemmon et al., 2008; Faulkender et al., 2012; Morellec, Nikolov, and Schurhoff, 2012; Elsas
and Florysiak, 2015). The cross-sectional relationship between firm capital structure and CEO’s
compensation structure, both highly persistent, may develop simply because they are determined
by a set of common factors. Exploring the dynamics of capital structure could mitigate this

concern. In addition, Cassell et al.’s (2012) findings are based on the relative CEO’s debt-toequity ratio, which is the CEO’s debt-to-equity ratio divided by the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio
that could give rise to a mechanical negative relation between inside debt and a firm’s debt ratio.2
Our measure separates CEO’s inside debt from the firm’s financial leverage and, as such, is not
subject to the mechanical relation problem.
Our study is also closely related to the empirical literature on capital structure dynamics. The
tradeoff theory dictates the existence of an optimal capital structure level (or range). In the event
ofa shock to capital structure, firms should rebalance their capital structure to eliminate the devi
ation. In an effort to reveal whether and how fast firms adjust toward an optimal capital structure,
many authors, including Fama and French (2002), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon et al.
(2008), Huang and Ritter (2009), and Elsas and Florysiak (2015), estimate a dynamic panel par
tial adjustment model with various estimation approaches.3 Monte Carlo simulations conducted
by Flannery and Hankins (2013) and Dang, Kim, and Shin (2015) find that the Elsas-Florysiak
(2015) DPF estimator and the Blundell-Bond (1998) system GMM estimator produce consistent
estimates. Faulkender et al. (2012), Warr et al. (2012), and Liao et al. (2015) use this dynamic
panel model to estimate target leverage. Then, in the second step, they estimate the heterogeneous
SOAs toward this target that hinge on factors including cash flows and corporate governance. We
will employ a similar procedure.

II. Data and Methodology
A. Variables
1. Main Variables

The key variables in this study are the firm’s capital structure and the CEO’s inside debt
holdings. A firm’s capital structure is measured by the debt-to-capital ratio, where debt is the
sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities and capital is the sum of total debt and
the market value of common equity. The market value of equity is calculated as the product of
the number of shares outstanding and the stock price at the end of a fiscal year. For robustness,
we also employ the book leverage ratio, which is total debt divided by the sum of debt and
book value of common equity, in all of our tests. We also use the alternative measure of debt
as total liabilities plus preferred stock minus deferred taxes with the results being qualitatively
similar.
The literature provides a few measures of inside debt with most based on the comparison
between the CEO’s inside debt holdings and the firm’s debt holdings (Wei and Yermack, 2011;
Cassell et al., 2012) in an effort to capture the incentive effect of inside debt. Since our purpose
is to examine the link between inside debt and firm leverage, we remove firm leverage from the
measure of inside debt in most of our investigation. To create an analog to our firm leverage
measure, we use the CEO’s inside-debt-to-incentive-compensation ratio, which is the ratio of
2 Cassell et al. (2012) acknowledge this potential drawback of their measure and warn that their “analyses investigating
the association between the relative CEO’s debt-to-equity ratio and financial leverage should be interpreted with caution”
(p. 592).

3 Hovakimian and Li (2012) critique the partial adjustment model as “ill-suited” citing the lack of a well-defined target.
DeAngelo and Roll (2015), however, fit the data well with the partial adjustment model and different target formations
supporting the validity of the model.

debt-type compensation to total incentive compensation.4 Debt-type compensation is found as the
sum of the present value of accumulated pension benefits and deferred compensation. Incentive
compensation also includes equity-type compensation (i.e., stock holdings, restricted shares, and
options). The value of stock is equal to the number of shares, including restricted shares, the
CEO holds multiplied by the stock price at the firm’s fiscal year-end. Following the literature,
particularly Cassell et al. (2012), we estimate the value of each individual tranche of exercisable
and unexercisable options the CEO holds using the Black-Scholes (1973) option model adjusted
for dividends based on Merton (1973). We then find the sum of these option tranche values to form
the total value of option holdings for the CEO.5 Nevertheless, we recognize that the comparison
between CEO’s inside debt holdings and the firm’s debt holdings is of particular interest when
considering what level of inside debt is optimal for capital structure decisions, so we create the
CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio as the CEO’s inside debt ratio divided by the firm’s market debt
ratio. This measure is essentially equivalent to the CEO to Firm Relative Debt/Equity Ratio in
Cassell et al. (2012). We winsorize this measure at the 99th percentile to avoid extreme values
caused by zero or a very low firm debt ratio in the denominator.
2. Control Variables

There are two sets of control variables for the determination of firm leverage levels and
firm leverage adjustments, respectively. Some firm characteristics, including firm size (Total
Assets), the Market-to-Book Ratio, Profitability, Asset Tangibility, Depreciation, and research and
development (R&D) expenses, are known to impact the benefits and/or costs of debt (Flannery and
Rangan, 2006). When R&D is missing, a value of zero is used and a separate dummy variable is set
equal to one. We also include the median value of the debt-to-capital ratio ofa two-digit standard
industrial classification (SIC) industry to control for industry effects. Corporate governance is
controlled for using the percentage of Independent Directors on the firm’s board and Institutional
Ownership as in Morellec et al. (2012) who find that good corporate governance encourages
the use of debt. We control for CEO Age as in Sundaram and Yermack (2007) who determine
that inside debt increases with the age of the CEO. Serfling (2014) also finds a negative relation
between CEO Age and firm riskiness that could indicate older CEOs avoid using debt. CEO Tenure
is another control as CEOs with longer tenures are more likely to be entrenched and more risk
averse (Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 1997; Coles et al., 2006). Finally, the CEO’s Vega/Delta Ratio
controls for the effects of equity-type compensation on CEO risk preference. The Vega and Delta
measure the sensitivity of the value of the CEO’s accumulated equity-type compensation to a 1%
change in the volatility of stock prices and to a 1% change in the stock price, respectively. Similar
to Cassell et al. (2012), we use the logarithm of the Vega/Delta ratio as a parsimonious measure.6
In the capital structure SOA model, we control for factors that the literature has identified
as influencing a firm’s leverage rebalancing decisions. Jalilvand and Harris (1984) confirm
that capital structure adjustment costs, and, as such, SOA, are affected by firm size. Fama and
French (2002) contend that dividend policy is a determinant of a firm’s capital structure and
examine SOAs for dividend payers and nondividend payers separately. Liao et al. (2015) test the
empirical implications of Morellec et al. (2012) and find that well-governed firms exhibit faster
SOAs as their managers are more willing to move leverage upward toward the shareholders’
4 For comparison with the literature, we also create an inside debt-to-equity ratio as the value of debt-type compensation
divided by equity-type compensation. Its summary statistics, reported in Table I, are consistent with the literature.

5 For more details, please see Cassell et al. (2012) in Appendix A.
6 In alternative specifications, we use the Vega and Delta separately and all the main results remain unchanged.

desired level. We use the fraction of Independent Directors and Institutional Ownership as
measures of corporate governance. CEO Age tenure, and equity-type compensation influence
CEO’s incentives and could affect the capital structure adjustments as well. Detailed variable
descriptions are provided in Appendix A.
B. Data
We extract information regarding CEOs’ pension benefits and deferred compensation, as well
as their stock and option holdings, for S&P 1500 firms from the Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp
database. The SEC expanded executive compensation disclosure requirements that mandate the
provision of detailed information regarding executive pension benefits and deferred compensation
began in 2006. As such, we begin our sample period in 2007. We then supplement the executive
compensation data with annual financial data from Compustat and fiscal year-end stock price
data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We require a firm to have all of
the compensation, financial, and stock price data available for at least two consecutive years to
be included in the sample. Our final sample consists of 10,015 observations for 1,874 firms from
2007 to 2013.

C. Methodology

The conventional partial adjustment model of capital structure dynamics is:
(1)

where Lit denotes the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of period t and Δ Lit = Lit — Li,t-1
is the adjustment in leverage during period t. Note that Dit = Lit — Li,t-1 is the deviation from
the target leverage ratio, Lit, at the beginning of period t. eit is the error term. In this model, λ
captures the fraction of leverage deviation that is removed in period t and this estimated coefficient
is the SOA. When λ = 1, the adjustment is complete. Depending upon the estimator used, the
estimated average SOA ranges from 0.10 to 0.40 (Fama and French, 2002; Flannery and Rangan,
2006; Lemmon et al., 2008; Huang and Ritter, 2009; Faulkender et al., 2012; Elsas and Florysiak
2015).
Following the literature, the target leverage ratio, Lit, is expressed as a linear combination of
leverage-determining factors, Lit = βXi,t-1, where Xi,t-1 represents those factors including a
fixed firm effect (Lemmon et al., 2008), fixed time effects, a set of time-varying firm character
istics as mentioned earlier (Flannery and Rangan, 2006), the median industry leverage ratio, and
corporate governance variables (Liao et al., 2015). We supplement the list of determinants with
CEO-related variables, including age, tenure, the Vega/Delta ratio, and the inside debt ratio, to
capture the effect of CEO compensation structure on the firm’s financial leverage. Model (1) can
then be rewritten as:
(2)

This specification allows us to examine the effect of CEO’s inside debt on firm leverage. The
large cross-section and short time series of financial data present great difficulties in estimating
this dynamic panel model (for discussion, please see Iliev and Welch, 2010; Flannery and Hankins,
2013) and the dependent variable in the range of [0, 1] further complicates this situation. Out of
all of the existing estimators, the simulation work of Dang et al. (2015) finds that an augmented

doubly censored Tobit estimator proposed by Elsas and Florysiak (2015), dubbed DPF estimator,
produces estimates with the greatest accuracy and efficiency. The DPF estimator, assuming a
parametric specification for the fixed effects distribution, uses a latent variable approach to
account for the fractional and endogenous lagged dependent variable as well as the unobserved
firm heterogeneity simultaneously.7 Thus, we employ the DPF method as our baseline estimator
for Model (2). In addition, because the Blundell and Bond (1998) system generalized method
of moments (GMM) has become virtually the standard estimator in the recent capital structure
literature (Lemmon et al., 2008; Faulkender et al., 2012; Liao et al., 2015), we also use the system
GMM to estimate Model (2) for robustness.8
To probe the effect of CEO’s inside debt holdings on capital structure adjustments, we conduct
both univariate and multivariate analyses. For the univariate analyses, we follow Faulkender
et al. (2012) and Warr et al. (2012) to estimate Model (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS) in
subsamples partitioned according to CEO’s inside debt holdings, with the target leverage, Li*t,
as the predicted value from Model (2). For the multivariate analyses, we modify Equation (1) as
follows to allow for CEO’s inside debt and other factors to affect SOA:
(3)

where Ei,t-1 denotes the CEO’s inside debt ratio and Ci,t-1 is the set of control variables dis
cussed earlier. To the extent that macroeconomic conditions affect capital structure adjustments
(Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Cook and Tang, 2010), fixed time effects are controlled for with
yearly dummies (but not reported in our tables). Note that λ1 is the primary variable of interest,
measuring the effect of CEO’s inside debt holdings on capital structure SOA. λ2 is the vector of
coefficients on the interaction items between the control variables and firm leverage deviations.
Since firm leverage deviation, Dit, is generated from a first-step regression, we use bootstrapped
standard errors (Pagan, 1984).
D. Endogeneity

The identification of the relation between CEO’s inside debt and firm leverage entails appropri
ately addressing the endogeneity issue present in empirical corporate finance research (Roberts
and Whited, 2013). In our case, endogeneity may arise as unobserved firm and/or CEO hetero
geneity determines both CEO’s inside debt holdings and firm leverage. For instance, the elasticity
of demand for the firm’s products to prices, which is often difficult to measure, is among the
factors that determine the firm’s business risk, which, in turn, influences the firm’s capital struc
ture policy, as well as executive compensation. As another example, an optimistic CEO might
be more willing to use debt financing and defer his own compensation, but the CEO’s optimism
is not observable. Lemmon et al. (2008) find that unobservable firm heterogeneity creates the
strong persistence of capital structure that accounts for 60% of the variation in debt ratios. In
Figure 1(a), we illustrate that the CEO’s inside debt ratio also exhibits strong persistence with
firms that start with high (low) CEO’s inside debt ratio ending up with a high (low) CEO’s inside
debt ratio. This implies the existence of time-invariant firm heterogeneity in the CEO’s inside
7 This approach is initiated by Loudermilk (2007) for balanced panel model estimation. Elsas and Florysiak (2015) extend
it to the case of unbalanced panels and name it DPF.
8 Flannery and Hankins (2013), based on Monte Carlo simulations, find that the Blundell-Bond (1998) system GMM
estimator produces consistent estimates in capital structure dynamics models. Dang et al. (2015, p. 85), notwithstanding,
find that the system GMM estimates to be “sensitive to the presence of unobservable heterogeneity and serially correlated
errors where their instruments become invalid.”

Figure 1. Firm Debt and CEO Debt Over Time
(a) The average debt ratio of firms in the three terciles (high, intermediate, and low) over time during the
firms’ event period. Firms are classified into subsamples based on their initial debt ratio. (b) The average
firm’s debt ratio and the CEO’s inside debt ratio in the full sample over the sample period. (c) The average
of the same two variables over the CEO’s tenure.

debt holdings. Thus, endogeneity due to omitted variables is indeed a valid concern. In addition,
reverse causality can be a problem. For instance, a CEO hired by a highly levered firm may be
concerned about the long-run survival of the firm, and may be more willing to accept equity-type
compensation than debt-type compensation.
We take a two-pronged approach to address endogeneity concerns in our model. First, in
addition to controlling for many observable firm characteristics (e.g., firm size, Market-to-Book
Ratio corporate governance, etc.) and CEO characteristics (e.g., age, tenure, and Vega/Delta
ratio), we use fixed firm effects to account for unobservable firm heterogeneity.9 This practice
would ameliorate the concern of omitted variables.
In addition, we employ an instrumental variable approach to establish the causality from
CEO’s inside debt to firm leverage. We use as an instrument the growth of the older population
(persons 65 years or old) between the 2000 and 2010 censuses in the state where the company
is headquartered.10 CEOs in popular migration destination states for the older population, like
Florida and California, might stay in their positions longer and have less need for pensions and
deferred compensation. The state-level growth of the older population is negatively associated
with the CEO’s inside debt holdings (ρ = -0.15) and is unlikely to have a direct association
with a firm’s capital structure. Another instrument is the median CEO’s inside debt holdings of
the two-digit SIC industry in each year (Cassell et al., 2012) as CEOs of same-industry firms
are likely to imitate their compensation structures. In a two-stage framework, we regress CEO’s
inside debt ratio on these instruments, as well as firm and CEO characteristics, in the first-stage
OLS estimation and use the predicted value in the second-stage DPF estimation of Model (2).

III. Results
A. Descriptive Statistics

Table I presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables included in our tests. The firm
market (book) debt ratio averages 0.285 (0.398) with a median of 0.241 (0.381). CEO’s inside debt
ratio averages 0.164 with a median of 0.064 anda standard deviation of 0.212. These statistics are
similar to Sundaram and Yermack (2007). While inside debt accounts for a very small percentage
of total CEO incentive compensation in a majority of firms, there exists a great variation in inside
debt holdings across firms. Consistent with this, CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio on average, is
greater than one, but this is attributable to the severe skewness to the right even after winsorizing
this variable to the 99th percentile. The median ofrelative leverage is 0.295, the maximum is 46.5,
and the standard deviation is 5.4. Decomposing inside debt into pension benefits and deferred
compensation, we find the former accounts for 9.6% and the latter for 6.8% of CEO incentive
compensation.
The CEO Vega/Delta Ratio averages 0.417 with a median of 0.329, similar to what Cassell
et al. (2012) report. The age of CEO ranges from 41 to 74 averaging 56. The average (median)
CEO Tenure in our sample is 7.2 (5) years. Roughly 80% of directors are independent. Note
9 CEO fixed effects are not considered. The inclusion of these effects would substantially reduce the sample size and
shorten the length of the time period for the sample firms as a large number of CEOs whose tenures do not exceed two
years would be excluded.

10 State-level population data are from the US Census Bureau. We considered both the logarithm of increase in the older
population and the percentage growth rate of the older population, and chose the former as the absolute change better
reflects the scale of migration of the older population across states. Furthermore, its correlation with CEO’s inside debt
ratio is greater in magnitude.

Table I. Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the paper. Variables definitions are
provided in Appendix A.
Variable

Mean

Median

SD

1st Percentile

99th Percentile

Firm Market Debt Ratio
Firm Book Debt Ratio
CEO Inside Debt Ratio
CEO Debt/Equity Ratio
CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio
CEO Pension Benefits
CEO Deferred Compensation
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
Outside Directors
Institutional Ownership
Total Assets ($million)
Market-to-Book Ratio
Profitability
Asset Tangibility
Depreciation
R&D
R&D Missing Dummy
Dividend Payer Dummy

0.285
0.398
0.164
0.363
1.503
0.096
0.068
0.417
55.8
7.2
0.795
0.758
13,982
1.216
0.113
0.252
0.038
0.020
0.513
0.592

0.241
0.381
0.064
0.069
0.295
0
0.010
0.329
56
5
0.8
0.795
3,160
0.991
0.111
0.164
0.033
0
1
1

0.218
0.245
0.212
0.748
5.426
0.171
0.120
0.395
6.8
6.7
0.096
0.191
36,833
0.951
0.105
0.244
0.033
0.052
0.500
0.492

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
41
0
0.538
0.016
98
0.127
-0.167
0.001
0.000
0
0
0

0.902
0.990
0.826
4.755
46.48
0.719
0.608
1.718
74
31
0.923
0.999
271,205
4.835
0.384
0.883
0.143
0.215
1
1

that the first percentile for the fraction of Independent Directors is 54%. Thus, essentially
all of the firms in our sample have a majority of Independent Directors on their boards in
compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) requirement. The lack of variation in the extent
of board independence may obscure the differential monitoring effect of Independent Directors.
On average, institutional shareholders own about 76% of the outstanding shares of our sample
firms.
Our average sample firm owns assets just below $14 billion USD, commands a Market-to-Book
Ratio of 1.216, and an operating Profitability ratio of 11.3%. Tangible assets, Depreciation, and
R&D expenses account for 25.2%, 3.8%, and 2.0% of Total Assets respectively. About 51% of
the sample firms do not report R&D expenses, and 59% pay dividends. In general, our sample
firms are similar to those in the literature.
B. Firms That Do Not Use Debt-Type Compensation

Many of our sample firms use little debt-type compensation as shown in the descriptive
statistics. Further examination finds that 3,210 firm-year observations, representing nearly onethird of all of the observations, have zero CEO’s inside debt. Zero inside debt most likely
occurs when the initiation and management costs of pension and/or deferred compensation plans
outweigh their benefits.11 Given that pension and deferred compensation plans may or may
11 Anecdotal evidence indicates that small firms are less likely to offer pension plans than large firms due to a lack of
resources. For instance, in 2011, in a US News & World Report article, a retirement consultant is cited, “Having a pension
plan is a fairly complicated thing to do and you need some resources to be able to deal with it .....
A small company
probably doesn’t want to deal with all the hassle when they can sign up for a 401(k) plan fairly easily.”

not be offered for a variety of different reasons (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007), one possible
explanation that firms avoid this type of compensation could be related to the unintended adverse
incentive effect it offers against shareholders (i.e., the effect of aggravating managerial risk
aversion). Overall, zero inside debt represents the censoring point of the variable. It is of interest
to determine whether these firms are different from firms that use inside debt in their CEOs’
compensation packages.
In Table II, we present the comparison between firms with zero CEO’s inside debt and those with
nonzero inside debt in terms of capital structure, inside debt, and CEO and firm characteristics.
For each variable, the mean and median are reported for both subsamples and the differences in
mean and median are shown in the last two columns on the right. Two sample t-tests and two
sample Brown-Hood tests, respectively, are employed to determine the statistical significance of
the differences in mean and median. Firms that use debt-type compensation borrow more, have
higher CEO Vega/Delta Ratios are greater in size, more profitable, own more tangible assets, have
lower depreciation of assets, invest less in R&D, and are more likely to pay dividends. Essentially
larger, more mature firms are more likely to use debt-type compensation. These firms have
relatively older CEOs, but they are not much different from their zero inside debt counterparts
in terms of CEO Tenure, board independence, or Institutional Ownership despite the statistical
significance of some of the differences. In short, firms that use debt-type compensation differ
from those that do not in firm characteristics, but not necessarily in CEO characteristics and
corporate governance.
It is worth noting that even zero inside debt firms, which commonly offer equity-type com
pensation to their CEOs, could suffer from managerial conservatism for two reasons. First, it is
difficult to kill two birds with one stone. While equity-type compensation often seeks to induce
effort it unlikely cures managerial conservatism completely at the same time. Second, the risk
shifting effect of equity compensation stems from the convexity of its payoff, which is probably
not adequate to align managers’ preference with shareholders who face similar convex payoffs
as managers are underdiversified when compared to shareholders. Therefore, despite their equity
compensation, managers could still use less financial leverage than shareholders desire and be
reluctant to adjust leverage when it is below the shareholders’ desired level.

C. CEO’s Inside Debt and Level of Firm Leverage: Univariate Analysis
We examine the correlation between the firm’s debt ratio and the CEO’s inside debt ratio in
Table III. A fairly large positive correlation (ρ at the level of 0.2) exists between the firm’s debt
ratio and the concurrent CEO’s inside debt ratio, as well as the lagged CEO’s inside debt ratio.
The components of CEO’s inside debt, pensions, and deferred compensation are also positively
correlated with the firm’s debt ratio. The change in firm’s debt ratio and CEO’s inside debt ratio
has a positive coefficient of 0.33. All of these positive associations could stem from common
factors that determine both variables, such as firm characteristics and time effects. When we
review the correlations of the change in the firm’s debt ratio with both the levels of the firm’s debt
ratio and the CEO’s inside debt ratio, we find interesting contrasts. The change in the firm’s debt
ratio is positively associated with the level of the concurrent firm’s debt ratio and CEO’s inside
debt, slightly negatively associated with the level of the firm’s debt ratio in the previous period
(ρ = -0.08), but much more strongly negatively correlated with the level of the CEO’s inside
debt ratio in the previous period (ρ = -0.27). Its correlations with lagged CEO pensions and
deferred compensation are also negative (ρ = -0.20 and -0.19, respectively). The patterns in the
correlations seem to indicate that despite the possible presence of common drivers for both firm

Table II. Firms with and without CEO’s Inside Debt
This table presents the mean and median of variables used for firms whose CEOs hold inside debt and
for those whose CEOs do not hold inside debt. Two-sample t-tests and the two-sample Brown-Hood tests,
respectively, are conducted to report the statistical significance of differences in mean and median across
the two subsamples.
Zero Inside Debt
(n = 3,212)

Variable

Firm Market
Debt Ratio
CEO Inside
Debt Ratio
CEO/Firm Relative
Debt Ratio
CEO Pension
Benefits
CEO Deferred
Compensation
CEO Vega/Delta
Ratio
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
Independent
Directors
Institutional
Ownership
Total Assets
($million)
Market-to-Book
Ratio
Profitability
Asset Tangibility
Depreciation
R&D
R&D Missing
Dummy
Dividend Payer
Dummy

Nonzero Inside Debt
(n = 6,803)

Difference In

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

0.254

0.195

0.300

0.254

0.000

0.000

0.242

0.181

0.000

0.000

2.213

0.766

0.000

0.000

0.142

0.036

0.000

0.000

0.100

0.050

0.355

0.236

0.447

0.372

54.6
7.5
0.771

54
5
0.800

56.4
7.1
0.806

56
5
0.800

‘‘‘
0.242‘‘‘
2.212‘‘‘
0.142‘‘‘
0.100‘‘‘
0.091‘‘‘
1.9‘‘‘
-0.3‘‘
0.036‘‘‘

0.758

0.795

0.758

0.795

0.000

0.000

3,951

1,281

18,718

4,757

1.437

1.133

1.111

0.927

0.105
0.210
0.044
0.035
0.586

0.106
0.116
0.036
0
1

0.117
0.271
0.035
0.013
0.478

0.114
0.184
0.032
0
0

‘‘‘
-0.206‘‘‘
0.008‘‘‘
0.068‘‘‘
-0.005‘‘‘

0.346

0

0.708

1

‘‘‘
-0.326‘‘‘
0.013‘‘‘
0.062‘‘‘
-0.008‘‘‘
-0.022‘‘‘
-0.108‘‘‘
0.362‘‘‘

Mean
0.046

14,767

Median

‘‘‘
0.181‘‘‘
0.766‘‘‘
0.036‘‘‘
0.050‘‘‘
0.137‘‘‘
0.060

2‘‘‘
0
0.000

3,476

0
-1‘‘‘
1‘‘‘

‘“Significant at the 0.01 level.
“Significant at the 0.05 level.
Significant at the 0.10 level.

‘

leverage and CEO’s inside debt, CEO’s inside debt might have an impact on the dynamics of firm
leverage.
We plot the firm’s leverage ratio and the CEO’s inside debt ratio together during our sample
period (Figure 1b), as well as during CEO Tenure (Figure 1c). During our sample period from
2007 to 2013, the two variables closely track each other, rising in 2008 and 2011 and declining
in all other years. Again, this demonstrates the presence of time-related factors that affect the

Table III. Correlations
This table presents the Pearson’s correlation of the firm’s debt ratio and the CEO’s inside debt ratio in time
t and t - 1, as well as their changes.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.83
0.59

0.04

(8)

(9)

(10) (11)

(1)

Firm Market Debt
Ratiot
(2) CEO Inside Debt
Ratiot
(3) CEO Pensiont
(4) CEO Deferred
Comp.t
(5) Firm Market Debt
Ratiot - 1
(6) CEO Inside Debt
Ratiot - 1
(7) CEO Pensiont - 1
(8) CEO Deferred
Comp.t - 1
(9) ΔFirm Market
Debt Ratiot
(10) ΔCEO Inside Debt
Ratiot
(11) ΔCEO Pensiont
(12) ΔCEO Deferred
Compt

0.24

0.21
0.13

0.82
0.59 0.03

0.86 0.19 0.18

0.09

0.20 0.82 0.70 0.46

0.25

0.17 0.70 0.84 0.03
0.11 0.47 0.03 0.78

0.21
0.13

0.08

0.33

0.24 0.24 -0.08

-0.27 -0.20 -0.19

0.27 0.10 0.07 0.07

-0.25

-0.08

-0.07 -0.05

0.07 0.26 0.31 0.01
0.04 0.21 0.00 0.37

-0.06 -0.20 -0.25 -0.01 0.78 0.26
-0.06 -0.18 -0.02 -0.29 0.64 0.18 0.02

0.31

two variables in similar ways. When plotted against CEO Tenure, interestingly, the two variables
exhibit a discernible mirror image contrast. In the first nine years of CEO Tenure, firm leverage
generally declines, while CEO’s inside debt holdings increases. Starting in the tenth year of a
CEO’s tenure, the trend reverses for both variables. What drives these patterns could be related to
a CEO’s risk aversion, but is outside the scope of this study. What it indicates about the relation
between CEO’s inside debt holdings and firm leverage is of greater interest. A firm tends to
make upward (downward) adjustments in financial leverage when its CEO’s inside debt holdings
decline (rise).
Extending the probe, we examine the adjustment in firm leverage in four subsamples based
on the lagged CEO’s inside debt ratio. Firms with zero inside debt, firms whose inside debt
ratio is nonzero, but less than 0.15, between 0.15 and 0.30, and above 0.30. There are 3,165,
3,183, 1,506, and 2,161 observations in these subsamples, respectively. The cutoffs are chosen
so that the low inside debt group has about the same size as the zero inside debt group, and
the intermediate inside debt group is of the same width for the range of the inside debt ratio
as the low inside debt group. Partitioning firms with nonzero inside debt into terciles yields
qualitatively similar results. Shown in Table IV, zero inside debt firms are different from other
firms using inside debt and, on average, they essentially do not adjust their capital structures.
Firms that use inside debt exhibit a monotonic declining trend in firm’s leverage ratio changes
as the lagged CEO’s inside debt ratio gets higher. Firms with low CEO’s inside debt adjust their
firm’s leverage ratios upwardly by 1.5 percentage points, those with intermediate inside debt
adjust firm’s leverage ratios upwardly by 0.8 percentage points, and those with high inside debt
adjust their firm’s leverage ratios downward by 1.0 percentage points. The difference in the firm’s

Table IV. CEO’s Inside Debt and Subsequent Change in Firm’s Debt Ratio
This table reports the mean and median changes in the firm’s debt ratio given different levels of lagged
CEO’s inside debt in the full sample. The CEO’s inside debt ratio is classified into four levels: zero, low
(lower than 0.15), intermediate (higher than 0.15, but lower than 0.30), and high (higher than 0.30). The
differences in mean and median changes in the firm’s debt ratio and their statistical significance based on
two-sample mean and median tests are reported.

CEO Inside Debtt -i
ΔFirm Debt Ratiot

Zero
[0, 0]

Low
(0, 0.15]

Intermediate
(0.15, 0.30]

High
(0.30, 1)

N
Mean
Median

3,165
0.002
-0.001

3,183
0.015
0.000

1,506
0.008
-0.002

2,161
-0.010
-0.013

High - Low

‘‘‘
‘‘‘

-0.025
-0.013

p-Value

<0.001
<0.001

‘“Significant at the 0.01 level.

leverage adjustment between high and low inside debt firms is statistically significant at the
1% level. The comparison of median firm’s leverage adjustments yields a similar pattern. These
comparisons again suggest a negative relation between CEO’s inside debt and firm leverage, and
invite more in-depth examination of this relation.
D. CEO’s Inside Debt and Level of Firm Leverage: Dynamic Panel Model
We use Model (2) to conduct the multivariate analyses. This model not only accounts for a
large array of control variables that are found to impact firm leverage, including observable firm
characteristics, corporate governance, and CEO characteristics, but also controls for unobserved
firm and time heterogeneity using lagged firm leverage and fixed firm and time effects. The
baseline estimator is the Elsas and Florysiak (2015) DPF method that is designed to deal with
unbalanced large-N, short-T, panel data with a fractional dependent variable.
The estimates are reported in Column (1) of Table V. First, the coefficient of lagged firm’s
debt ratio is 0.751 implying a SOA of 0.249 consistent with Elsas and Florysiak (2015). Lagged
CEO’s inside debt ratio, presented near the bottom, loads negatively with a coefficient of-0.079
that is statistically significant at the 1% level. This confirms the presence of a negative relation
between CEO’s inside debt and firm leverage, even after controlling for all other factors. A
one-standard deviation increase (0.212) in the CEO’s inside debt ratio corresponds to a decline
of 1.7 percentage points in the firm’s market debt ratio. This effect is not large, but it is also
not trivial considering the mean (median) annual leverage adjustment is 0.4 (-0.2) percentage
points.
Except for R&D, all of the firm characteristic variables significantly impact the market debt
ratio. We find that board independence is negatively related to firm leverage, which is not
consistent with the idea that a more independent board encourages excessively conservative
CEOs to take on more debt. However, since all boards have a majority of Independent Directors
after SOX, it has become less clear how Independent Directors may impact CEO monitoring.
Consistent with Liao et al. (2015), Institutional Ownership receives a positive and statistically
significant coefficient indicating that shareholders encourage the use of debt. CEO Age is also
negatively associated with the firm’s debt ratio consistent with the notion that older CEOs become
more risk averse (Serfling, 2014). The coefficient estimate for CEO Tenure is not statistically

Table V. CEO’s Inside Debt and Firm Leverage
This table presents the estimations of the dynamic panel model of capital structure. The dependent variable
is the firm’s market debt ratio. Independent variables include the conventional set of firm characteristics
that impact tax benefits and bankruptcy costs including firm size, the Market-to-Book Ratio, Profitability,
Asset Tangibility, Depreciation, R&D, missing R&D dummy, and the industry median leverage. Variables
that represent shareholders’ interests include the percentage of outside directors on a board and Institutional
Ownership and CEO characteristics including age, tenure, the Vega/Delta ratio, and the inside debt ratio.
Column (2) includes a dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEO does not hold inside debt in the
previous year. The models are estimated using the Elsas and Florysiak (2015) dynamic panel dependent
variable (DPF) estimator. Column (3) reports the second-stage DPF estimates when the state-level growth
of the older population (65 years or older) and the industry median CEO’s inside debt ratio are used as the
instruments for the CEO’s inside debt ratio. Column (4) provides estimates using the Blundell-Bond (1998)
system GMM estimator. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.

(1)
DPF
Firm Debt Ratiot - 1
Ln(Assetst -1)

Market-to-Book Ratiot - 1
Profitabilityt - 1

Asset Tangibilityt - 1
Depreciationt - 1

R&Dt - 1

R&D Missing Dummyt - 1
Industry Median Debt Ratio

Independent Directorst - 1

Institutional Ownershipt - 1

Ln(CEO Age)
Ln(1+CEO Tenure)
CEO Vega/Delta Ratiot - 1
CEO Inside Debt Ratiot - 1

(2)
DPF

0.751***
(0.009)
0.032
(0.005)
0.031
(0.003)
0.079
(0.021)
0.153
(0.033)
-0.858
(0.129)
0.009
(0.067)
-0.019
(0.012)
0.050
(0.010)
-0.038
(0.018)
0.080
(0.010)
-0.068
(0.000)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.004
(0.001)
-0.079
(0.011)

***
***
***
***
***

***
**
***
***
***
***

Zero CEO Debt Ratio Dummy
Constant

0.016
(0.017)

(3)
Two-Stage DPF

***
***
***
***
***
***

0.752
(0.009)
0.031
(0.005)
0.031
(0.003)
0.079
(0.021)
0.153
(0.033)
-0.857
(0.129)
0.009
(0.067)
-0.019
(0.012)
0.051
(0.010)
-0.038
(0.018)
0.080
(0.010)
-0.068
(0.000)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.005
(0.001)
-0.081
(0.012)
-0.004
(0.001)
0.021
(0.017)

***
**
***
***
***
***
***

***
***
***
***
***
***

0.739
(0.009)
0.032
(0.005)
0.031
(0.003)
0.080
0.022
0.136
(0.033)
-0.827
(0.131)
-0.002
(0.067)
-0.019
(0.012)
0.053
(0.010)
-0.037
(0.018)
0.072
(0.010)
-0.002
(0.000)
0.001
(0.000)
-0.005
(0.001)
-0.095
(0.018)

***
**
***
***
**
***
***

0.000
(0.017)

(4)
GMM

***

0.762
(0.038)
-0.007
(0.008)
-0.013
(0.007)
0.067
(0.071)
-0.062
(0.070)
0.452
(0.586)
-0.025
(0.243)
-0.048
(0.035)
0.037
(0.099)
-0.082
(0.059)
0.051
(0.048)
0.092
(0.109)
-0.014
(0.014)
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.075
(0.034)
-0.096
(0.032)
-0.113
(0.427)

*

**
***

(Continued)

Table V. CEO’s Inside Debt and Firm Leverage (Continued)

Year Dummies
Wald χ2
Prob > χ2

(1)
DPF

(2)
DPF

(3)
Two-Stage DPF

(4)
GMM

Yes
33,817
0.000

Yes
33,825
0.000

Yes
32,870
0.000

Yes
2,332
0.000

‘“Significant at the 0.01 level.
“Significant at the 0.05 level.
Significant at the 0.10 level.

‘

different from zero. This is not surprising given the inverse V-shape pattern between CEO Tenure
and firm leverage as shown in Figure 1(c). Surprisingly, the CEO Vega/Delta ratio is negatively
related to the firm’s market debt ratio indicating that CEOs who have equity-type compensation
that is more sensitive to the volatility of the firm’s stock price and/or less sensitive to the change
in the firm’s stock price tend to avoid the use of debt financing.12
In Column (2), we consider firms that offer no debt-type compensation to their CEOs separately
by including a dummy variable that is equal to one for firms offering zero inside debt, and
zero otherwise. The dummy variable receives a negative coefficient of-0.004 that is statistically
significant at the 1% level indicating that these firms do use less debt financing, but the difference
is fairly small. All other results remain nearly the same.
Then, we directly address the potential endogeneity concerns pertaining to CEO’s inside debt
even after controlling for firm and CEO characteristics, unobservable firm and time heterogeneity,
and the lagged independent variable. Our approach is to use growth of the older population in the
state where the firm is headquartered and the median CEO’s inside debt ratio of the industry as
instruments.13 Specifically, we run an OLS regression of the CEO’s inside debt ratio on the two
instrument variables and all other control variables used in Model (2), and then use the predicted
value of the CEO’s inside debt ratio in the previous period to replace the CEO’s inside debt ratio
in Column (1). We then estimate the second-stage model using the DPF estimator. The results are
presented in Column (3). The CEO’s inside debt ratio obtains a coefficient of -0.095, statistically
significant at the 1% level. Thus, after controlling for potential endogeneity, we find that CEO’s
inside debt negatively affects the firm’s leverage ratio.
As a robustness check, we also apply the widely used Blundell-Bond (1998) system GMM
estimator to Model (2) and report the estimates in Column (4). This approach uses a vector of
lagged levels and differences of the dependent variable to address the problem of the persistent
regressor. It also confers the convenience of using similar instruments for endogenous variables.14
Although most control variables do not have coefficients that are significantly different from zero,
12 This is inconsistent with the notion that Vega encourages risk taking (Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 2006). Notwithstanding,
Cassell et al. (2012) obtain a similar negative and statistically significant relationship between the CEO Vega/Delta Ratio
and the firm’s book leverage (see their table VI).
13 We conduct the Finlay, Magnusson, and Schaffer (2013) weak instrument tests to check the validity of these instruments
in the DPF (Tobit) context. We obtain a 95% confidence interval of [-0.117, 0.029] for the coefficient of CEO’s inside
debt ratio (the coefficient estimate is -0.095), and an overidentification test J-statistic of 2.10 with a p-value of 0.147. In
addition, both instruments have a fairly strong correlation with the CEO’s inside debt ratio (-0.15 and 0.41, respectively),
and the first-stage regression yields an adjusted R2 of 0.275. All of these results indicate that our instruments are valid.
Please find the first-stage estimation in Appendix B.

14 We use lags 2 to 5 of levels and differences as instruments and also treat CEO’s inside debt, Independent Directors,
Institutional Ownership, and the CEO Vega/Delta Ratio as endogenous.

two main results hold unchanged. First, the SOA is 0.238. In addition, the CEO’s inside debt ratio
loads negatively with a coefficient of -0.075. Moreover, the zero CEO’s inside debt dummy
receives a statistically significant, negative coefficient of a larger magnitude, -0.096. Thus, the
system GMM estimator produces results consistent with the DPF estimates.

E. Shareholders’ Desired Leverage

Morellec et al. (2012) hold that self-interested managers have target leverage that is below
the shareholders’ desired level. Liao et al. (2015) verify this claim empirically. To the extent
that CEO’s inside debt holdings escalate the shareholders-manager divergence in risk preference,
the positive (negative) coefficient on Institutional Ownership (CEO’s inside debt ratio) we have
obtained above is consistent with their findings. Institutional shareholders would like to see higher
firm leverage, while CEOs with inside debt tend to keep firm leverage at a lower level. These
incongruous incentives have profound implications for the target leverage estimation. Since
managers are hired by shareholders to run the company, the level of leverage that maximizes
shareholder wealth should be the target leverage. In other words, a firm should move its financial
leverage toward the shareholders’ desired level. This level is different from the predicted value
in Model (2) where CEOs’ private interests could distort capital structure choices. In fact, the
target leverage to maximize shareholder wealth can be achieved only if the CEO’s interests are
perfectly aligned with shareholders’. Based on this idea, we estimate the shareholders’ desired
leverage using the coefficients in Column (1) of Table V, assuming institutional shareholders
own all outstanding shares and CEOs are compensated with equity, but no inside debt. When
Institutional Ownership is one and CEO’s inside debt is zero, shareholders have a strong voice
in the firm’s policies and CEOs are subject to a lower level of (or ideally no) conservatism. The
latter is true as equity-type compensation encourages risk taking and debt-type compensation that
could worsen managerial conservatism is nonexistent. Then it is most likely that CEOs’ capital
structure decisions are consistent with what shareholders desire, and our ad hoc estimates reflect
the shareholders’ desired leverage.
Appendix C reports the summary statistics of our estimated shareholders’ desired leverage
and deviation from this target leverage. The mean (median) of this measure is 0.316 (0.275),
0.035 (0.039) higher than the actual market debt ratio. Relative to the shareholders’ desired
leverage, 8,054 firm-year observations are underlevered and merely 1,961 are overlevered. The
predominance of underlevered firms is evidence of the divergence of incentives between the CEOs
and shareholders, consistent with our conjecture that excessively conservative CEOs intentionally
keep firm leverage low.15
F. CEO’s Inside Debt and Capital Structure Adjustments

As shown in Liao et al. (2015), the sign of leverage deviation could influence the CEO’s
attitude toward capital structure adjustments. Since the CEO’s desired leverage is lower than that
of shareholders, both the CEO and the shareholders would like to lower firm leverage when
leverage is above the shareholders’ desired level. If leverage is below the shareholders’ desired
level, however, the shareholders would want to boost leverage to the desired level, while the CEO
15 On average, firms are underlevered due to managerial conservatism. Individual firms, though, might witness temporary
overshoots in leverage due to “shocks,” such as an unexpected market price decline. The overlevered situation may also
emerge if a firm decides to issue a large amount of debt, rather than selling small amounts of debt in several issues, when
expecting growing market capitalization in the future. The overlevered situation may last for quite a long time if it is the
result of financial distress as the firm may find it difficult to raise equity capital and reduce debt.

Table VI. CEO’s Inside Debt and Subsequent Change in Firm’s Debt Ratio Given
Leverage Deviations
This table presents the mean and median changes in the firm’s debt ratio given different levels of lagged
CEO’s inside debt in the subsamples of underlevered (Panel A) or overlevered (Panel B) firms, respectively.
The CEO’s inside debt ratio is classified into four levels: zero, low (lower than 0.15), intermediate (higher
than 0.15, but lower than 0.30), and high (higher than 0.30). The differences in mean and median changes
in the firm’s debt ratio and their statistical significance based on two-sample mean and median tests are
reported.

CEO Inside Debtt -i
ΔFirm Debt Ratiot

Zero
[0, 0]

Low
(0, 0.15]

Intermediate
(0.15, 0.30]

High
(0.30, 1)

High - Low

p-Value

Panel A. Underlevered Firms

N
Mean
Median

2,282
0.027
0.000

2,603
0.028
0.006

1,305
0.018
0.001

1,864
0.007
-0.007

-0.021
-0.013

297
-0.120
-0.100

-0.075
-0.061

‘‘‘
‘‘‘

<0.001
<0.001

‘‘‘
‘‘‘

<0.001
<0.001

Panel B. Overlevered Firms

N
Mean
Median

883
-0.062
-0.054

580
-0.045
-0.039

201
-0.056
-0.050

‘“Significant at the 0.01 level.

may not. To the extent that inside debt holding aggravates the CEO’s excessive conservatism,
higher inside debt holding would give rise to faster adjustments toward the target leverage in the
overlevered domain, but impede adjustments in the underlevered domain.
To test this hypothesis, we first partition the underlevered firms and overlevered firms separately
into four subsamples of firms with zero, low, intermediate, and high levels of the lagged CEO’s
inside debt ratio, and then consider their leverage adjustment patterns in the subsequent year.
Table VI presents the results. Overall, underlevered firms adjust leverage upward, overlevered
firms adjust leverage downward, and the magnitude of the adjustment is dependent upon the
CEO’s inside debt holdings. On average, in the underlevered domain (Panel A), firms with low
CEO’s inside debt holdings adjust their market debt ratio upward by 2.8 percentage points, firms
with intermediate CEO’s inside debt holdings adjust by 1.8 percentage points, and those with
high CEO’s inside debt holdings adjust by merely 0.7 percentage points. The medians present a
similar pattern. The differences in mean and median adjustments across the high and low CEO’s
inside debt subsamples are statistically significant at the 1% level. In the overlevered domain
(Panel B), firms with low, intermediate, and high CEO’s inside debt holdings adjust their debt
ratio downward by 4.5, 5.6, and 12.0 percentage points, respectively. In short, CEO’s inside debt
holding speeds up leverage adjustments from above the shareholders’ desired level, but impedes
adjustments from below the shareholders’ desired level.
A rigorous examination of the effect of CEO’s inside debt on the firm’s leverage adjustments
is based on Model (3), where target leverage is the shareholders’ desired level and the capital
structure SOA is allowed to vary with CEO’s inside debt and other factors. As discussed in Section
II.A, control variables include certain firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and corporate
governance measures. We estimate the model in the full sample and then in the subsamples of

Table VII. CEO’s Inside Debt and Capital Structure Adjustments
The table reports the results from estimating the model: ∆Lit = (λ0 + λ 1 Ei,t -1 + λ2 Ci,t - 1) Dit + Ɛit in
the full sample and two subsamples: firms where the market debt ratio is above the shareholders’ desired
level (“Overlevered”) or below this level (“Underlevered”). In the model, Dit denotes the deviation from the
shareholders’ desired market leverage of firm iat the start of period t. Ei,t -1 represents the CEO’s inside debt
ratio. Ci,t - 1 are a set of control variables including the CEO Vega/Delta Ratio, age, tenure, outside directors,
Institutional Ownership, firm size, and dividend payer indicator, as well as year dummies (coefficients not
reported). λ1 and λ2 are coefficients on the interaction items between CEO leverage and firm leverage
deviation, and those between the control variables and the firm leverage deviation, respectively. A dummy
variable that indicates zero CEO’s inside debt is also considered in Specification (2). Bootstrapped standard
errors are reported in brackets.

Full Sample
(n = 10,015)
(2)

(1)

CEO Inside Debt Ratiot - 1

0.069
(0.138)

Zero CEO Inside Debtt - 1

CEO Vega/Delta Ratiot - 1
CEO Aget
CEO Tenuret
Independent Directorst - 1

Institutional Ownershipt - 1
Log(Assets)t - 1
Dividend Payert - 1

Constant

Year Dummies
R2

0.023
(0.017)
0.000
(0.004)
0.004
(0.004)
0.023
(0.182)
0.590
(0.125)
-0.030
(0.013)
-0.354
(0.058)
-0.041
(0.260)
Yes
0.176

‘‘‘
‘‘
‘‘‘

Underlevered
(n = 8,054)

Overlevered
(n = 1,961)
(1)

0.113
(0.141)
0.057
(0.064)
0.024
(0.017)
0.001
(0.004)
0.004
(0.004)
0.030
(0.182)
0.603
(0.125)
-0.026
(0.014)
-0.343
(0.059)
-0.126
(0.282)
Yes
0.176

‘‘‘
‘
‘‘‘

(1)

(2)

‘‘‘

1.942
(0.371)

0.004
(0.042)
0.006
(0.011)
-0.006
(0.011)
0.696
(0.791)
-0.536
(0.350)
-0.061
(0.043)
-0.011
(0.153)
0.934
(0.918)
Yes
0.274

‘‘‘

2.018
(0.446)
0.067
(0.184)
0.004
(0.043)
0.006
(0.011)
-0.006
(0.011)
0.731
(0.791)
-0.520
(0.353)
-0.057
(0.046)
-0.004
(0.153)
0.817
(0.979)
Yes
0.274

(2)

‘‘‘

-0.272
(0.085)

0.010
(0.019)
-0.002
(0.004)
0.006
(0.004)
-0.048
(0.173)
0.703
(0.118)
-0.014
(0.012)
-0.093
(0.052)
-0.386
(0.238)
Yes
0.165

‘‘‘

‘

‘‘‘

-0.289
(0.091)
-0.027
(0.064)
0.009
(0.018)
-0.002
(0.004)
0.006
(0.003)
-0.050
(0.173)
0.697
(0.117)
-0.016
(0.013)
-0.098
(0.053)
-0.345
(0.259)
Yes
0.165

‘

‘‘‘
‘

at the 0.01 level.
“Significant at the 0.05 level.
‘Significant at the 0.10 level.

*** Significant

overlevered and underlevered firms separately. We also consider a slightly different specification,
Specification (2), where firms with zero CEO’s inside debt holdings are treated specially with a
dummy variable. Table VII reports the results.
In the full sample, CEO’s inside debt receives statistically insignificant coefficient esti
mates regardless of the specification, but these near-zero coefficients conceal the real effect
of CEO’s inside debt as demonstrated below. In the overlevered subsample, the coefficient of
the CEO’s inside debt ratio is 1.94, statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that
higher CEO’s inside debt holdings are associated with faster adjustments toward the share
holders’ desired level. This association is economically very large. A one-standard deviation

increase (0.212) in the CEO’s inside debt ratio would accelerate the SOA by about 0.40, hold
ing all else equal. In the underlevered domain, however, the CEO’s inside debt ratio obtains
statistically significant, negative coefficients of approximately -0.28, indicating that a onestandard deviation increase in the CEO’s inside debt ratio slows down the SOA by nearly
0.06, still an economically large effect. In Specification (2), the results are qualitatively un
changed. The opposite signs of the CEO’s inside debt coefficient estimates in the over- and
underlevered domains are consistent with our expectations that CEO’s inside debt holdings ex
acerbate their excessive conservatism. Consequentially, CEOs are eager to reduce the use of
debt when the firm is overlevered, but reluctant to increase the use of debt when the firm is
underlevered.
G. Optimal CEO’s Inside Debt Holdings for Capital Structure Decisions

Debt-type compensation for managers alleviates the conflict of interest between managers
and debtholders and lowers the agency cost of debt, but exacerbates the divergence in attitude
toward risk between managers and shareholders. Identifying this tradeoff may help in determin
ing an inside debt level that is optimal for capital structure decisions and CEO’s inside debt
holdings that facilitate the fastest capital structure adjustment toward the shareholders’ desired
level.
Given the positive correlation between the CEO’s inside debt ratio and the firm’s debt ratio,
the CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio defined as the CEO’s inside debt ratio divided by the firm’s
market debt ratio, is relevant for answering this question.16 Using the relative ratio rather than
the absolute CEO’s inside debt ratio also helps answer the question whether an equity bias in
executive compensation is beneficial (Edmans and Liu, 2011). Our strategy is to estimate the
capital structure SOA in subsamples based on different levels of CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio
and find at what level we obtain the greatest SOA. We first single out the 3,210 firm-year
observations with zero CEO’s inside debt as the first subsample. We then divide firms having a
positive CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio that is below the median of 0.295 into two subsamples,
(0, 0.10], and (0.10, 0.295]. Finally, the remaining observations having above median CEO/Firm
Relative Debt Ratio are partitioned into five quantiles. These cutoffs give rise to seven subsamples
that include six with roughly equal numbers of nonzero relative debt ratio observations. The SOA
is estimated using Model (1), where leverage deviation is that from the shareholders’ desired
level.
The estimated SOAs are presented in Table VIII. In Panel A, the SOA is 0.764 for zero inside
debt firms, and jumps to 1.091 for firms with relative debt ratios below 0.1. The SOA declines
to 0.960 in the next subsample and keeps declining monotonically to 0.083 in the last subsample
with the highest CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio. The SOA peaks when the CEO’s inside debt
ratio is around 10% of the Firm Market Debt Ratio.
The CEO-shareholders divergence of risk preference is more pronounced when upward adjust
ments are needed. Thus, we repeat the above SOA comparisons in the subsamples of underlevered
firms. The cutoffs for forming the subsamples are the same. Panel B of Table VIII reports that the
estimated SOA exhibits an identical pattern where it rises considerably from the zero inside debt
subsample to the (0, 0.10] domain, and then monotonically declines as the CEO/Firm Relative
Debt Ratio increases. Thus, with regard to capital structure adjustments, we find the optimal
CEO’s inside debt holdings are very low, at around 10% of the firm’s market debt-to-capital
ratio.
16 The CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio is set to its median value, 0.295, in case both the numerator and denominator are
zero. The results do not change if we exclude observations with a zero CEO’s inside debt ratio and a zero firm’s debt ratio.

Table VIII. Capital Structure SOAs Given Different Relative CEO/Firm Debt Ratios
This table presents the estimated speeds of adjustment (SOAs) in subsamples defined by the relative CEO/firm debt ratio. The SOA is estimated in the
second-stage regression ΛLit = λ Dit + Ɛit, where ∆Lit is the change in firm i-s leverage ratio in period t, Dit represents the deviation from the shareholders’
desired leverage of firm i at the start of period t, and λ is the SOA. The model is estimated using OLS. Firms with zero CEO’s inside debt constitute a subsample.
Firms with nonzero CEO’s inside debt are classified into seven roughly equal-sized subsamples based on the value of the CEO’s inside debt ratio/firm debt ratio.
Number of observations and R2 of the regression for each subsample are also reported.

CEO 1 nside Debt Ratio/Firm Debt Ratio

[0,0]

(0, 0.100]

(0.100,0.295]

(0.295,0.569]

(0.569,0.900]

(0.900, 1.343]

(1.343,2.301]

(2.301, ∞)

1.002
0.609
0.098

1.001
0.310
0.061

1.002
0.083
-0.031

913
0.535
0.055

950
0.263
0.046

970
-0.030
-0.027

Panel A. Full Sample
Nobs
Estimated SOA
R2

3.210
0.764
0.122

871
1.091
0.196

925
0.960
0.149

1.003
0.823
0.136

1.001
0.783
0.112

Panel B. Underlevered Firms
Nobs
Estimated SOA
R2

2,289
0.522
0.015

599
0.874
0.057

683
0.830
0.061

800
0.714
0.073

850
0.704
0.063

Table IX. CEO’s Inside Debt and Firm Book Leverage
This table presents the estimation of the dynamic panel model of capital structure. The dependent variable
is the firm’s book debt ratio. Independent variables include the conventional set of firm characteristics that
impact tax benefits and bankruptcy costs including firm size, Market-to-Book Ratio, Profitability, Asset
Tangibility, Depreciation, R&D, missing R&D dummy, and the industry median leverage. Variables that
represent shareholders’ interests include the percentage of outside directors on a board and Institutional
Ownership and CEO characteristics including age, tenure, the Vega/Delta ratio, and the inside debt ratio.
Column (2) includes a dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEO does not hold inside debt in the
previous year. The models are estimated using the Elsas and Florysiak (2015) dynamic panel dependent
variable (DPF) estimator. Column (3) provides the second-stage DPF estimates when the state-level growth
of the older population (65 years or older) and the industry median CEO’s inside debt ratio are used as
the instruments for the CEO’s inside debt ratio. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Wald test
chi-squares of the model are reported at the bottom.
(2)
FPD

(1)
FPD

Firm Debt Ratiot - 1

Ln(Assetst -1)

Market-to-Book Ratiot - 1
Profitabilityt - 1

Asset Tangibilityt - 1
Depreciationt - 1

R&Dt - 1

R&D Missing Dummyt - 1
Industry Median Debt Ratio

Independent Directorst - 1

Institutional Ownershipt - 1

Ln(CEO Age)

Ln(1+CEO Tenure)
CEO Vega/Delta Ratiot - 1
CEO Inside Debt Ratiot - 1

0.767***
(0.022)
0.015
(0.005)
0.014
(0.002)
0.005
(0.021)
0.154
(0.031)
-0.266
(0.122)
-0.285
(0.063)
-0.021
(0.011)
0.072
(0.012)
-0.034
(0.017)
0.029
(0.010)
-0.016
(0.020)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.017
(0.010)

***
***
***
**
***
*
***
**
***

*
*

Zero CEO Debt Ratio Dummy

Constant

0.056
(0.053)

(3)
Two-Stage FPD

***
***
***

0.763
(0.022)
0.014
(0.005)
0.014
(0.002)
0.004
(0.021)
0.154
(0.031)
-0.263
(0.122)
-0.286
(0.063)
-0.021
(0.011)
0.074
(0.012)
-0.034
(0.017)
0.028
(0.010)
-0.015
(0.020)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.019
(0.010)
-0.008
(0.003)
0.071
(0.054)

***
**
***
*
***
**
***
***

*
*
**

***
***
***

0.753
(0.021)
0.014
(0.005)
0.014
(0.002)
0.003
(0.021)
0.148
(0.031)
-0.237
(0.123)
-0.293
(0.063)
-0.021
(0.011)
0.072
(0.012)
-0.033
(0.017)
0.022
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.004)
0.008
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.064
(0.023)

***
*
***
*
***
**

*
*
***
*

-0.041
(0.022)
(Continued)

Table IX. CEO’s Inside Debt and Firm Book Leverage (Continued)

Year Dummies
Wald χ2
Prob > χ 2

(1)
FPD

(2)
FPD

(3)
Two-Stage FPD

Yes
23,095
0.000

Yes
22,854
0.000

Yes
21,850
0.000

at the 0.01 level.
**Significant at the 0.05 level.
*Significant at the 0.10 level.

*** Significant

This result echoes Edmans and Liu’s (2011) insight that an equity bias is often optimal. Edmans
and Liu (2011) envision that even when managers are risk neutral and excessive conservatism is
irrelevant, an equity bias is desired to induce effort. In the presence of managerial conservatism,
a greater equity bias would be beneficial as its risk-shifting effect encourages managers to take
risks.
A caveat is in order. While our investigation is only from the angle of capital structure
decisions, debt-type compensation also affects other aspects of corporate policies as docu
mented in the literature, which would, in turn, impact firm value. In particular, pensions are
offered for purposes other than providing incentives, such as building manager-firm “bonding”
(Sundaram and Yermack, 2007), mitigating shirking to avoid costly losses in retirement pay
due to early termination (Lazear, 1979), and enabling firms more control over retirement pay
outs (Lazear, 1979, 1983). Thus, we should not view the inside debt level that is conducive to
the optimal capital structure decision as equivalent to the optimal level that maximizes firm
value.

H. Robustness Check with Book Leverage

All of our results thus far are based on the market debt ratio. Some of the literature (Faulkender
et al., 2012) uses the book debt ratio arguing that book leverage is more likely to be under the
control of managers. We examine the effect of the CEO’s inside debt ratio on the level and
SOA of firm book leverage in Tables IX and X, respectively. In Table IX, where the results
from estimating Model (2) are reported, lagged firm’s debt ratio receives highly significant
coefficient estimates of around 0.76, while the lagged CEO’s inside debt ratio receives statistically
significant, negative coefficient estimates between -0.017 and -0.064, regardless of the model
specification (i.e., exclusion or inclusion of the zero inside debt dummy) or estimation approach.
In Table X, CEO’s inside debt commands positive coefficients that are marginally statistically
significant in the overlevered subsample, but negative and statistically significant coefficients in
the underlevered subsample. The results are qualitatively similar to those based on market debt
ratio.
I.

Which Matters, Pensions or Other Deferred Compensation?

Between pension plans and other deferred compensation, the former resembles unsecured
debt more closely as supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs) are often unfunded and
unsecured. In contrast, with some special arrangements, deferred compensation may be invested
in equity and withdrawn flexibly before retirement. Thus, the incentive effect of pensions may
be stronger than that of deferred compensation. Consistent with this, Anantharaman et al. (2014)

Table X. CEO’s Inside Debt and Adjustments of Book Leverage
The table reports the results from estimating the model: ∆Lit = (λ0 + λ 1 Ei,t -1 + λ2 Ci,t - 1) Dit + Ɛit in
the full sample and two subsamples: firms where the book leverage ratio is above the shareholders’ desired
level (“Overlevered”), or below this level (“Underlevered”). In the model, Dit denotes the deviation from the
shareholders’ desired book leverage of firm i at the start of period t. Ei,t -1 represents the CEO’s inside debt
ratio. Ci,t - 1 are a set of control variables including the CEO Vega/Delta Ratio, age, tenure, outside directors,
Institutional Ownership, firm size, and dividend payer indicator, as well as year dummies (coefficients not
reported). λ1 and λ2 are coefficients on the interaction items between CEO leverage and firm leverage
deviation, and those between control variables and firm leverage deviation, respectively. A dummy variable
that indicates zero CEO’s inside debt is also considered in Specification (2). Bootstrapped standard errors
are reported in brackets.
Full Sample
(n = 10,015)
(1)

CEO Inside Debt Ratiot - 1

(2)

0.097
(0.206)

Zero CEO Inside Debtt - 1
CEO Vega/Delta Ratiot - 1
CEO Aget
CEO Tenuret
Independent Directorst - 1

Institutional Ownershipt - 1

Log(Assets)t - 1

Dividend Payert - 1

Constant
Year Dummies
R2

Overlevered
(n = 1,961)

-0.003
(0.018)
-0.001
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.005)
0.538
(0.301)
0.106
(0.185)
-0.073
(0.023)
-0.027
(0.068)
0.553
(0.401)
Yes
0.074

‘

‘‘‘

0.088
(0.214)
(0.010)
(0.078)
-0.003
(0.018)
-0.001
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.005)
0.535
(0.301)
0.104
(0.185)
-0.073
(0.024)
-0.028
(0.068)
0.569
(0.414)
Yes
0.074

‘

‘‘‘

Underlevered
(n = 8,054)

(1)

(2)

0.424
(0.325)

0.557
(0.337)
0.145
(0.109)
-0.016
(0.025)
-0.002
(0.008)
-0.007
(0.007)
0.563
(0.442)
-0.417
(0.317)
-0.079
(0.043)
-0.045
(0.091)
0.987
(0.647)
Yes
0.073

-0.016
(0.025)
-0.002
(0.008)
-0.008
(0.007)
0.520
(0.443)
-0.424
(0.317)
-0.090
(0.042)
-0.068
(0.092)
1.191
(0.641)
Yes
0.072

‘‘
‘

(1)

‘

‘

(2)

‘

-0.363
(0.195)

0.004
(0.024)
-0.001
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.006)
0.453
(0.406)
0.548
(0.189)
-0.060
(0.024)
0.080
(0.097)
0.066
(0.520)
Yes
0.061

‘‘‘
‘‘

‘‘

-0.518
(0.210)
-0.175
(0.111)
0.002
(0.024)
-0.002
(0.007)
-0.001
(0.006)
0.411
(0.403)
0.518
(0.190)
-0.072
(0.024)
0.063
(0.098)
0.385
(0.549)
Yes
0.062

‘‘‘
‘‘‘

***Significant at the 0.01 level.
“Significant at the 0.05 level.
Significant at the 0.10 level.

‘

find that higher debt-type compensation leads to lower promised yield and fewer covenants in
corporate loans, but this effect is caused entirely by benefits accrued under SERPs. It is of interest
to examine whether the debt-reduction effect of inside debt is attributable solely to pensions, but
not to deferred compensation.
We investigate this question first in Model (1) by using the pension to total incentive com
pensation ratio and the deferred compensation to total incentive compensation ratio in place of
the total CEO’s inside debt ratio. Both ratios load negatively with a coefficient that is of similar
size (about -0.08) and are statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, pensions or deferred
compensation have similar effects on the level of financial leverage. Then, we estimate Model

(2 ) using the two component inside debt ratios and find, similar to the results in Table VII,
that both ratios load negatively (positively) in the regression for the underlevered (overlevered)
subsample. In either subsample, the coefficient of pension to the incentive compensation ratio
is greater in magnitude than that of the deferred compensation to the incentive compensation
ratio, and is of greater statistical significance. Thus, as both pensions and deferred compensation
encourage faster capital structure adjustments in an overlevered situation and impede adjustments
in an underlevered situation, the effect of pensions is somewhat stronger than that of deferred
compensation.17

IV. Conclusions
Since Jensen and Meckling (1976), it has been argued that both equity and debt compensation
should be included in managerial compensation contracts in order to incentivize managers to take
both shareholders’ and debtholders’ interests into account when making financing and investment
decisions. Edmans and Liu (2011) theoretically derive an optimal compensation contract that
uses equity compensation as a solution to the manager-shareholder agency conflict, as it induces
managerial effort, and debt compensation as a solution to the shareholder-debtholder agency
conflict, as it incentivizes managers to avoid risk shifting that transfers wealth from debtholders
to shareholders.
In this article, we investigate the impact of CEO’s inside debt holdings on capital structure
dynamics. We find that the CEO’s inside debt ratio, measured using both pension plans and
deferred compensation data, is negatively associated with firm leverage. We then estimate share
holders’ desired leverage where shareholder wealth is maximized and examine how CEO’s inside
debt affects the firm’s SOA toward this level for overlevered and underlevered firms. We find
that greater CEO’s inside debt holdings spur an overlevered firm to adjust capital structure at
a more rapid pace toward its shareholders’ desired level, but impedes such adjustments for an
underlevered firm. Finally, estimating the capital structure SOAs in subsamples of firms hav
ing different levels of CEO’s inside debt ratios, we find that the CEO’s inside debt ratio that
is conducive to optimal capital structure dynamics is around 10% of the firm’s market debt
ratio.
This article is the first to empirically investigate the impact CEO’s inside debt has on cap
ital structure dynamics. Our findings indicate that debt-type compensation exacerbates man
agers’ excessive conservatism that leads to lower than optimal use of debt and slower capital
structure adjustments toward shareholders’ desired level, which is detrimental to shareholders’
interests.
Since managers, even without inside debt, tend to be more risk averse than shareholders,
they are aligned with debtholder interests to some extent. A main purpose served by debt
type compensation is to align the interest of managers with debtholders, but only at the ex
pense of shareholders as it increases the divergence in risk preferences between managers and
shareholders. Thus, the optimal compensation structure is unlikely to be similar to the firm’s
capital structure as Jensen and Meckling (1976) conjecture, and a large equity bias (Edmans
and Liu, 2011) is probably necessary. This finding has profound implications concerning the
design of executive compensation packages. While pensions and deferred compensation may
serve good purposes, firms should also take note of their adverse effects on managers’ risk
attitudes.
17 These results are available upon request.

Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Variable

Firm Market Debt Ratio

Firm Book Debt Ratio

CEO Inside Debt Ratio

CEO Debt/Equity Ratio

CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio

CEO Pension Benefits
CEO Deferred Compensation
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio

CEO Age
CEO Tenure
Independent Directors
Institutional Ownership

Total Assets ($million)
Market-to-Book Ratio

Profitability
Asset Tangibility
Depreciation
R&D
R&D Missing Dummy
Dividend Payer Dummy

Definition

Total book debt/(total book debt + market equity), where total
debt is the sum of long-term debt and notes payable, and
market equity is found as the product of the number of
shares outstanding and share price at the fiscal year-end.
Total book debt/(total book debt + book equity), where total
debt is the sum of long-term debt and notes payable.
CEO’s inside debt holdings, including pension and deferred
compensation, divided by total compensation. Inside debt
holdings are the sum of the present value of accumulated
pension benefits and deferred compensation. CEO total
compensation also includes the value of stock and stock
options. Stock value is calculated by multiplying the number
of shares held (including restricted shares) by the stock price
at the firm’s fiscal year-end. Following Cassel et al. (2012),
we apply the Black-Scholes (1973) option valuation formula
for each individual tranche of options held by the CEO and
sum the tranche value to a grand total.
CEO’s debt-type compensation divided by equity-type
compensation.
CEO’s inside debt ratio/firm debt ratio. It is set to the median
value (0.295) in case both CEO’s debt ratio and firm’s debt
ratio are zero, and set to the 99th percentile value (46.48) if
the CEO’s debt ratio is positive, while firm’s debt ratio is
zero.
CEO pension benefits divided by total compensation.
CEO deferred compensation divided by total compensation.
The ratio of the Vega (the sensitivity of the value of the CEO’s
accumulated equity-based compensation to a 1% change in
the volatility of stock prices) to the Delta (the sensitivity of
the value of the CEO’s accumulated equity-based
compensation to a 1% change in the stock price) (Grant,
Markarian, and Parbonetti, 2009). Vega and Delta are
calculated following Core and Guay (2002).
The age of the CEO.
The tenure of the CEO.
The percentage of independent directors on the board.
The percentage of common shares owned by institutional
investors.
Total assets in million 2005 constant dollars.
(Market value of common equity + book value of debt +
preferred stock - deferred tax and investment tax
credit)/book value of assets.
Operating income before depreciation divided by total assets.
Property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets.
Depreciation and amortization divided by total assets.
R&D divided by total assets. Set to zero if missing.
Equal to one if R&D is not reported, and zero otherwise.
Equal to one for dividend payers, and zero for nonpayers.

Appendix B: First-Stage Estimation for Two-Stage DPF
This independent variable is the CEO’s inside debt ratio. The OLS estimation is reported in
this table. The predicted value is lagged before being used in the second-stage DPF estimation as
the instrument for lagged CEO Inside Debt Ratio.
Independent Variable

Firm Debt Ratiot _ 1
Ln(assetst -1)
Market-to-Book Ratio t _ 1
Profitabilityt _ 1
Asset Tangibilityt _ 1
Depreciationt _ 1
R&D t — 1
R&D Missing Dummyt _ 1
Industry Median Debt Ratio
Independent Directorst _ 1
Institutional Ownershipt- 1
Ln(CEO Age)
Ln(1+CEO Tenure)
CEO Vega/Delta Ratiot — 1
Old Population (Age 65 or Above) Change 2000-2010
in State
Industry Median CEO Inside Debt Ratiot _ 1
Constant
Adjusted R2

Coefficient

SE

t-Value

0.055***
0.023***
-0.009
0.007
0.039
-0.307
-0.146
0.009
-0.110
0.164
-0.022
0.004
-0.001
0.014

0.011
0.001
0.002
0.022
0.010
0.076
0.045
0.004
0.018
0.019
0.010
0.000
0.000
0.001

5.003
17.972
-3.739
0.301
3.974
-4.066
-3.261
2.002
-6.071
8.572
-2.308
13.888
-2.748
11.212

0.004
0.021
0.034

-10.314
29.946
-4.071

***
***
***
***
**
***
***
**
***
***
***
-0.044***
0.614***
-0.136***
0.275

at the 0.01 level.
**Significant at the 0.05 level.

*** Significant

Appendix C: Shareholders’ Desired Beverage
This table presents the summary statistics of the estimated shareholders’ desired leverage
and the deviation from this target leverage at the start of the period. The shareholders’ desired
leverage is estimated based on Model (2), using coefficients from Column (1) of Table V, and
assuming the Institutional Ownership is one and CEO’s inside debt ratio is zero. For details,
please see Section III.E.
Variable

Mean

Median

SD

Shareholders’ desired debt
ratiot
Firm Market Debt
Ratiot - 1
Deviation from
shareholders’ desired
leverage

0.316

0.275

0.196

0

0.845

0.281

0.235

0.217

0

0.134

0.035

0.039

0.048

1st percentile

-0.104

99th percentile

0.134
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